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Abstract
We propose a novel robust aggregation rule for distributed synchronous Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) under a general Byzantine failure model. The attackers
can arbitrarily manipulate the data transferred between the servers and the workers
in the parameter server (PS) architecture. We prove the Byzantine resilience
of the proposed aggregation rules. Empirical analysis shows that the proposed
techniques outperform current approaches for realistic use cases and Byzantine
attack scenarios.
1 Introduction
The failure resilience of distributed machine-learning systems has attracted increasing attention [1, 2,
5, 18] in the community. Larger clusters can accelerate training. However, this makes the distributed
system more vulnerable to different kinds of failures or even attacks [7]. Thus, failure/attack resilience
is becoming more and more important for distributed machine-learning systems, especially for large-
scale deep learning [6, 16].
In this paper, we consider the most general failure model, Byzantine failures [11], where the attackers
can know any information of the other processes, and attack any value in transmission. To be more
specific, the data transmission between the machines can be replaced by arbitrary values. Under such
model, there are no constraints on the failures or attackers.
The distributed training framework studied in this paper is the Parameter Server (PS). The PS
architecture is composed of the server nodes and the worker nodes. The server nodes maintain a
global copy of the model, aggregate the gradients from the workers, apply the gradients to the model,
and broadcast the latest model to the workers. The worker nodes pull the latest model from the
server nodes, compute the gradients according to the local portion of the training data, and send the
gradients to the server nodes. The entire dataset and the corresponding workload is distributed to
multiple worker nodes, thus parallelizing the computation via partitioning the dataset.
In this paper, we study the Byzantine resilience of synchronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD),
which is a popular class of learning algorithms using PS architecture. Its variants are widely used in
training deep neural networks [9, 17]. Such algorithms always wait to collect gradients from all the
worker nodes before moving on to the next iteration.
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Figure 1: The 2 figures visualize 5 workers with 8-dimensional gradients. The ith row represents
the gradient vector produced by the ith worker. The jth column represents the jth dimension of
the gradients. A shadow block represents that the corresponding value is replaced by a Byzantine
value. In the two examples, the maximal number of Byzantine values for each dimension is 2. For
the classic Byzantine model, all the Byzantine values must lie in the same workers (rows), while for
the generalized Byzantine model there is no such constraint. Thus, (a) is a special case of (b).
The failure model can be described by using an m × d matrix consisting of the d-dimensional
gradients produced by m workers, as visualized in Figure 1. Previous work [2] has so far addressed a
special case, where the Byzantine values must lie in the same rows (workers) as shown in Figure 1(a).
Our failure model generalizes the classic Byzantine failure model by placing the Byzantine values
anywhere in the matrix without any constraint. For example, Lee et al. [12] describes the vulnerability
to bit-flipping attacks of a wireless transmission technology. The servers could receive data via
such vulnerable communication media, even if the messages are encrypted. As a result, an arbitrary
fraction of the received values are Byzantine.
There are two limitations lying in most of the existing Byzantine-resilient SGD algorithms [2, 5].
First, they only consider the classic Byzantine model shown in Figure 1(a). However, the Byzantine
failures can also happen in the communication media/interfaces on the server side, which yields
the generalized Byzantine model shown in Figure 1(b). Second, the algorithms are based on the
Euclidean norm, which suffers from the curse of dimensionality. When the dimension gets higher, it
will be more difficult to distinguish the Byzantine gradients from the correct ones.
In this paper, we study the dimensional Byzantine-resilient algorithms, which tolerate the generalized
Byzantine model under certain conditions, and are not affected by the curse of dimensionality. We
propose Byzantine-resilient trimmed-mean-based aggregation rules. We assume that for each dimen-
sion, the number of Byzantine values must be less than the number of correct ones. The resilience to
such Byzantine model is called “dimensional Byzantine resilience". The main contributions of this
paper are listed below:
• We formulate the dimensional Byzantine resilience property, and prove that the proposed trimmed-
mean-based approaches are dimensional Byzantine-resilient (Definition 5). As far as we know, this
paper is the first one to study generalized Byzantine failures and dimensional Byzantine resilience
for synchronous SGD.
• We show that the proposed aggregation rules have low computation cost. The time complexities
are nearly linear, which are of the same order as averaging–the default choice for non-Byzantine
aggregation.
2 Model
We consider the following optimization problem:
min
x
F (x),
where F (x) = Ez∼D[f(x; z)], z is sampled from some unknown distribution D. We assume that
there exists a minimizer of F (x), which is denoted by x∗.
We solve this problem in a distributed manner with m workers. In each iteration, each worker will
sample n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data points from the distribution D, and
compute the gradient of the local empirical loss Fi(x) = 1n
∑n
j=1 f(x; z
i,j),∀i ∈ [m], where zi,j is
the jth sampled data on the ith worker. The servers will collect and aggregate the gradients sent by
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the workers, and update the model as follows:
xt+1 = xt − γtAggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}),
where Aggr(·) is an aggregation rule (e.g., averaging), and {v˜ti : i ∈ [m]} is the set of gradient
estimators received by the servers in the tth iteration. Under Byzantine failures/attacks, {vti =∇Fi(xt) : i ∈ [m]} is partially replaced by arbitrary values, which yields {v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}.
3 Byzantine resilience
In this section, we formally define the classic Byzantine resilience property and its generalized
version: dimensional Byzantine resilience.
Suppose that in a specific iteration, the correct vectors {vi : i ∈ [m]} are i.i.d samples drawn from
the random variable G =
∑n
j=1∇f(x; zj), where E[G] = g is an unbiased estimator of the gradient
based on the current parameter x. Thus, E[vi] = E[G] = g, for any i ∈ [m]. We simplify the
notations by ignoring the index of iteration t.
We first introduce the classic Byzantine model, which is reformulated from the model proposed by
Blanchard et al. [2]. With the Byzantine workers, the vectors {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} which are actually
received by the server nodes are as follows:
Definition 1 (Classic Byzantine Model).
v˜i =
{
vi, if the ith worker is correct,
arbitrary, if the ith worker is Byzantine.
(1)
Note that the indices of Byzantine workers can change across different iterations. Furthermore, the
server nodes are not aware of which workers are Byzantine. The only information given is the number
of Byzantine workers, if necessary.
We then introduce the classic Byzantine resilience.
Definition 2. (Classic ∆-Byzantine Resilience). Assume that 0 ≤ q ≤ m. Let {vi : i ∈ [m]} be
any i.i.d. random vectors in Rd, vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g. Let {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} be the set of vectors,
of which up to q of them are replaced by arbitrary vectors in Rd, while the others still equal to
the corresponding {vi}. Aggregation rule Aggr(·) is said to be classic ∆-Byzantine resilient if
E‖Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 ≤ ∆, where ∆ is a constant dependent on m and q.
The baseline algorithm Krum is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Krum chooses the vector with the minimal local sum of distances: Krum({v˜i : i ∈
[m]}) = v˜k, k = argmini∈[m]
∑
i→j ‖v˜i − v˜j‖2, where i → j is the indices of the m − q − 2
nearest neighbours of v˜i in {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} measured by Euclidean distance.
The Krum aggregation is classic ∆-Byzantine resilient under certain assumptions. The proof is given
by Proposition 1 of Blanchard et al. [2].
Lemma 1 (Blanchard et al. [2]). Let v1, . . . , vm be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G− g‖2 ≤ V . q of {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} are Byzantine. If 2q + 2 < m, we
have E‖Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 ≤ ∆0, where ∆0 =
(
6m− 6q + 4q(m−q−2)+4q2(m−q−1)m−2q−2
)
V.
The generalized Byzantine model is denoted as:
Definition 4 (Generalized Byzantine Model).
(v˜i)j =
{
(vi)j , if the the jth dimension of vi is correct,
arbitrary, otherwise,
(2)
where (vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi.
Based on the Byzantine model above, we introduce a generalized Byzantine resilience property,
dimensional ∆-Byzantine resilience, which is defined as follows:
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Definition 5. (Dimensional ∆-Byzantine Resilience). Assume that 0 ≤ q ≤ m. Let {vi : i ∈ [m]}
be any i.i.d. random vectors in Rd, vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g. Let {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} be the set
of candidate vectors. For each dimension, up to q of the m values are replaced by arbitrary
values, i.e., for dimension j ∈ [d], q of {(v˜i)j : i ∈ [m]} are Byzantine, where (v˜i)j is the jth
dimension of the vector v˜i. Aggregation rule Aggr(·) is said to be dimensional ∆-Byzantine resilient
if E‖Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 ≤ ∆, where ∆ is a constant dependent on m and q.
Note that classic ∆-Byzantine resilience is a special case of dimensional ∆-Byzantine resilience. For
classic Byzantine resilience defined in Definition 2, all the Byzantine values must lie in the same
subset of workers, as shown in Figure 1(a).
In the following propositions, we show that Mean and Krum are not dimensional Byzantine re-
silient (E‖Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 is unbounded). The proofs are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The averaging aggregation rule is not dimensional Byzantine-resilient.
Proposition 2. Any aggregation rule Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} is
not dimensional Byzantine resilient.
Krum chooses the vector with the minimal score, which is not dimensional Byzantine-resilient.
Proposition 3. Krum(·) is not dimensional Byzantine-resilient.
4 Trimmed-mean-based aggregation
With the Byzantine failure model defined in Equation (1) and (2), we propose two trimmed-mean-
based aggregation rules, which are Byzantine resilient under certain conditions.
4.1 Trimmed mean
To define the trimmed mean, we first define the order statistics.
Definition 6. (Order Statistics) By sorting the scalar sequence {ui : i ∈ [m]}, we get u1:m ≤
u2:m ≤ . . . ≤ um:m, where uk:m is the kth smallest element in {ui : i ∈ [m]}.
Then, we define the trimmed mean.
Definition 7. (Trimmed Mean) For b ∈ Z ∩ [0, dm/2e − 1], the b-trimmed mean of the set of scalars
{ui : i ∈ [m]} is defined as follows:
Trmeanb({ui : i ∈ [m]}) = 1
m− 2b
m−b∑
k=b+1
uk:m,
where uk:m is the kth smallest element in {ui : i ∈ [m]} defined in Definition 6. The high-dimensional
version, Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}), simply applies Trmeanb(·) in the coordinate-wise manner.
The following theorem claims that by using Trmeanb(·), the resulting vector is dimensional Byzantine
resilient. A proof is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 1. (Bounded Variance) Let v1, . . . , vm be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G − g‖2 ≤ V . In each dimension, q values are Byzantine, which
yields {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}. If 2q < m, we have E‖Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) − g‖2 ≤ ∆1, where
∆1 =
2(b+1)(m−q)
(m−b−q)2 V.
Theorem 1 tells us that the upper bound of the variance E ‖Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 decreases
when m increases, b decreases, q decreases, or V decreases.
4.2 Beyond trimmed mean
Using the trimmed mean, we have to drop 2b elements for each dimension. In this section, we explore
the possibility of aggregating more elements. To be more specific, for each dimension, we take the
average of the m − b values nearest to the trimmed mean. We call the resulting aggregation rule
Phocas 1, which is defined as follows:
1The name of a Byzantine emperor.
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Definition 8. (Phocas) We sort the scalar sequence {ui : i ∈ [m]} by using the distance to a certain
value y: |u1/y − y| ≤ |u2/y − y| ≤ . . . ≤ |um/y − y|, where uk/y is the kth nearest element to y in
{ui : i ∈ [m]}. Phocas is the average of the first (m− b) nearest elements to the b-trimmed mean
Trmeanb = Trmeanb({ui : i ∈ [m]}):
Phocasb({ui : i ∈ [m]}) =
∑m−b
i=1 ui/Trmeanb
m− b .
The high-dimensional version, Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}), simply applies Phocasb(·) in the coordinate-
wise manner.
We show that Phocas(·) is dimensional Byzantine-resilient.
Theorem 2. (Bounded Variance) Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G − g‖2 ≤ V . In each dimension, q values are Byzantine, which
yields {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} If 2q < n, we have E‖Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) − g‖2 ≤ ∆2, where
∆2 =
[
4 + 12(b+1)(m−q)(m−b−q)2
]
V.
The Phocas aggregation can be viewed as a trimmed average centering at the trimmed mean, which
filters out the values far away from the trimmed mean. Similar to the trimmed mean, the variance of
Phocas decreases when m increases, b decreases, q decreases, or V decreases.
4.3 Convergence analysis
In this section, we provide the convergence guarantees for synchronous SGD with ∆-Byzantine-
resilient aggregation rules. The proofs can be found in the appendix. We first introduce the two
conditions necessary in our convergence analysis.
Definition 9. If F (x) is LF -smooth, then F (y)− F (x) ≤ 〈∇F (x), y − x〉+ LF2 ‖y − x‖2,∀x, y ∈
Rd, where LF ≥ 0. If F (x) is µF -strongly convex, then 〈∇F (x), y − x〉+ µF2 ‖y − x‖2 ≤ F (y)−
F (x),∀x, y ∈ Rd, where µF ≥ 0.
First, we prove that for strongly convex and smooth loss functions, SGD with ∆-Byzantine-resilient
aggregation rules has linear convergence with a constant error.
Theorem 3. Assume that F (x) is µF -strongly convex and LF -smooth, where 0 < µF ≤ LF . We
take γ ≤ 2µF+LF . In any iteration t, the correct gradients are vti = ∇Fi(xt). Using any (classic
or dimensional) ∆-Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule with corresponding assumptions, we obtain
linear convergence with a constant error after T iterations with synchronous SGD:
E‖xT − x∗‖ ≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)T
‖x0 − x∗‖+ µF + LF
µFLF
γ
√
∆.
Then, we prove the convergence of SGD for general smooth loss functions.
Theorem 4. Assume that F (x) is LF -smooth and potentially non-convex, where 0 < LF . We
take γ ≤ 1LF . In any iteration t, the correct gradients are vti = ∇Fi(xt). Using any (classic or
dimensional) ∆-Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule with corresponding assumptions, we obtain
linear convergence with a constant error after T iterations with synchronous SGD:∑T−1
i=0 E‖∇F (xi)‖2
T
≤ 2
γT
[
F (x0)− F (x∗)]+ ∆.
4.4 Time complexity
For the trimmed mean, we only need to find the order statistics of each dimension. To do so, we use
the so-called selection algorithm [3] with linear time complexity to find the kth smallest element. In
general, the time complexity is O(d(m− 2b)m). When b is large, the factor m− 2b  m can be
ignored, which yields the nearly linear time complexity O(dm). When b is small, the time complexity
is the same as the sorting algorithm, which is O(dm logm). For Phocas, the computation additional
to computing the trimmed takes linear timeO(dm). Thus, the time complexity is the same as Trmean.
Note that for Krum and Multi-Krum, the time complexity is O(dm2) [2].
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Table 1: Experiment Summary
Dataset # train # test γ # rounds Batchsize Evaluation metric
MNIST [15] 60k 10k 0.1 500 32 top-1 accuracy
CIFAR10 [10] 50k 10k 5e-4 4000 128 top-3 accuracy
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(a) Gaussian attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are re-
placed by i.i.d. random vectors drawn from a Gaussian
distribution with 0 mean and 200 standard deviation.
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(b) Omniscient attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors
are replaced by the negative sum of all the correct
gradients, scaled by a large constant (1e20).
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(c) Bit-flip attack. For each of the first 1000 dimen-
sions, 1 of the 20 floating numbers is manipulated by
flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th bits.
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(d) Gambler attack. The parameters are evenly as-
signed to 20 servers. For one single server, any re-
ceived value is multiplied by −1e20 with probability
0.05%.
Figure 2: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with different attacks.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity to hyperparameters.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the Byzantine resilience properties of the proposed algorithms. We
consider two image classification tasks: handwritten digits classification on MNIST dataset using
multi-layer perceptron (MLP), and object recognition on convolutional neural network (CNN). The
details of these two neural networks can be found in the appendix. There are m = 20 worker
processes. We repeat each experiment for ten times and take the average. The details of the datasets
and the default hyperparameters of the corresponding models are listed in Table 1. We use top-1 or
top-3 accuracy on testing sets (disjoint from the training sets) as evaluation metrics.
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The baseline aggregation rules are Mean, Krum (Definition 3), and Multi-Krum. Multi-Krum is a
variant of Krum defined in Blanchard et al. [2], which takes the average on several vectors selected
by multiple rounds of Krum. We also include the averaging without Byzantine failures as a baseline,
which is referred to as Mean without Byzantine. We compare these baseline algorithms with the
proposed algorithms: Trmean defined in Definition 7, and Phocas defined in Definition 8, under
different attacks.
Note that all the experiments of CNN on CIFAR10 show similar results with the experiments of MLP
on MNIST. Thus, we put the results of CNN in the appendix.
5.1 Byzantine resilience
In this section, we test the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms under different kinds of
attacks. The zoomed figure of each experiment can be found in the appendix.
5.1.1 Gaussian attack
We test classic Byzantine resilience in this experiment. We consider the attackers that replace some
of the gradient vectors with Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and isotropic covariance matrix
with standard deviation 200. We refer to this kind of attack as Gaussian attack. 6 out of the 20
gradient vectors are Byzantine. The results are shown in Figure 2(a). As expected, averaging is not
Byzantine resilient. The gaps between all the other algorithms are tiny. Phocas performs like there
are no Byzantine failures at all. Krum, Multi-Krum, and Trmean converge slightly slower.
5.1.2 Omniscient attack
We test classic Byzantine resilience in this experiment. This kind of attacker is assumed to know the
all the correct gradients. For each Byzantine gradient vector, the gradient is replaced by the negative
sum of all the correct gradients, scaled by a large constant (1e20 in the experiments). Roughly
speaking, this attack tries to make the parameter server go into the opposite direction with a long
step. 6 out of the 20 gradient vectors are Byzantine. The results are shown in Figure 2(b). Phocas
still performs just like there is no failure. Multi-Krum is not as good as Phocas, but the gap is small.
Krum converges slower. However, Trmean converges to bad solutions.
5.1.3 Bit-flip attack
We test dimensional Byzantine resilience in this experiment. Knowing the information of other
workers can be difficult in practice. Thus, we use more realistic scenario in this experiment. The
attacker only manipulates some individual floating numbers by flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th
bits. Furthermore, we test dimensional Byzantine resilience in this experiment. For each of the first
1000 dimensions, 1 of the 20 floating numbers is manipulated using the bit-flip attack. The results are
shown in Figure 2(c). As expected, only Phocas and Trmean are dimensional Byzantine resilient.
Note that for Krum and Multi-Krum, their assumption requires the number of Byzantine vectors q
to satisfy 2q + 2 < m, which means q ≤ 8 in our experiments. However, because each gradient is
partially manipulated, all the m vectors are Byzantine, which breaks the assumption of the Krum-
based algorithms. Furthermore, to compute the distances to the (m − q − 2)-nearest neighbours,
m − q − 2 must be positive. To test the performance of Krum and Multi-Krum, we set q = 8 for
these two algorithms so that they can still be executed. Furthermore, we test whether tuning q can
make a difference. The results are shown in Figure 3(a). Obviously, whatever q we use, Krum-based
algorithms get stuck around bad solutions.
5.1.4 General attack with multiple servers
We test general Byzantine resilience in this experiment. We evaluate the robust aggregation rules
under a more general and realistic type of attack. It is very popular to partition the parameters into
disjoint subsets, and use multiple server nodes to storage and aggregate them [8, 13, 14]. We assume
that the parameters are evenly partitioned and assigned to the server nodes. The attacker picks one
server, and manipulates any floating number by multiplying −1e20, with probability of 0.05%. We
call this attack gambler, because the attacker randomly manipulates the values, with the goal that
in some iterations the assumptions/prerequisites of the robust aggregation rules are broken, which
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crashes the training. Such an attack requires less global information, and can be concentrated on one
single server, which makes it more realistic and easier to implement.
In Figure 2(d), we evaluate the performance of all the robust aggregation rules under the gambler
attack. The number of servers is 20. For Krum, Multi-Krum and Phocas, we set the estimated
Byzantine number q = b = 8. Only Phocas and Trmean survive under this attack. The convergence
is slightly slower than the averaging without Byzantine values, but the gaps are small.
5.1.5 Sensitivity to the hyperparameters
We test the robustness to the estimated number of Byzantine workers b (q for Krum and Multi-Krum)
in this experiment. We show the maximal accuracy throughout the training. The results are shown in
Figure 3(b). The performance of Phocas and Trmean does not significantly change when b varies.
5.2 Discussion
As expected, Mean aggregation is not Byzantine resilient. Krum, Multi-Krum are classic Byzantine-
resilient but not dimensional Byzantine-resilient. Phocas and Trmean are dimensional Byzantine
resilient. However, under omniscient attack, Trmean suffers from larger variances, which slow down
the convergence.
The gambler attack shows the true advantage of dimensional Byzantine resilience: higher probability
of survival. Under such attack, chances are that the assumptions/prerequisites of Phocas and Trmean
may still fail. However, their probability of crashing is less than the other algorithms because
dimensional Byzantine resilience generalizes classic Byzantine resilience. An interesting observation
is that Trmean is slightly better than Phocas under gambler attack. That is because the estimation of
q = b = 8 is not accurate, which will cause some unpredictable behavior for Phocas. We choose
q = b = 8 because it is the maximal value we can take for Krum and Multi-Krum.
It is obvious that Phocas performs best in almost cases. Multi-Krum is also good, except that
it is not dimensional Byzantine-resilient. The reason why Phocas and Multi-Krum have better
performance is that they aggregate more candidates to stabilize the convergence. Note that Phocas
not only performs just as well as or even better than Multi-Krum, but also has lower time complexity.
Trmean has the cheapest computation. Its worst case, omniscient attack, is hard to implement in
reality. Thus, for most applications, we suggest Trmean as an easy-to-implement aggregation rule
with robust performance. However, if we assume the worst cases of the attacks/failures, Phocas
should be adopted for best robustness.
6 Related work
Our work is closely related to Blanchard et al. [2] and Yin et al. [18]. Another paper [5] proposed
grouped geometric median for Byzantine resilience, with strongly convex functions.
Our approach offers the following important advantages over the previous work.
• Cheaper computation compared to Krum. Trmean and Phocas have nearly linear time com-
plexity, while the time complexity of Krum is O(m2d).
• Dimensional Byzantine resilience. Trmean and Phocas tolerate a more general type of Byzantine
failures described in Equation (2) and Definition 5, while Krum can only tolerate the classic
Byzantine failures described in Equation (1) and Definition 2.
• Simpler dimension-free convergence guarantees with fewer assumptions. Yin et al. [18] also
study the Byzantine resilience of the trimmed mean and its special case, median. However, in that
work, the bounds grow with the number of dimensions d, even if the variance of gradients V is
fixed. To establish the bounds, the authors assume bounded domain, and sub-exponential gradients
with bounded skewness, which are not required in our theoretical analysis. In this paper, we use
fewer assumptions to prove the dimension-free theoretical guarantees of trimmed mean.
The major contribution of this paper is a combination of theory and practice. First, we provide
the theoretical guarantee of the convergence of the trimmed mean with fewer assumptions. Then,
we propose a novel aggregation rule, Phocas, which has comparable theoretical guarantees, and
comparable or even better performance in the experiments.
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7 Conclusion
We investigate the generalized Byzantine resilience, and propose trimmed-mean-based aggregation
rules for synchronous SGD. The algorithms have low time complexity and provable convergence. Our
empirical results show good performance. We will study the Byzantine resilience in other scenarios
such as asynchronous training in the future work.
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8 Appendix
In the appendix, we introduce several useful lemmas and use them to derive the detailed proofs of the
theorems in this paper.
8.1 Dimensional Byzantine resilience
Lemma 1 (Blanchard et al. [2]). Let v1, . . . , vm be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G− g‖2 ≤ V . q of {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} are Byzantine. If 2q + 2 < m, we
have E‖Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2 ≤ ∆0, where ∆0 =
(
6m− 6q + 4q(m−q−2)+4q2(m−q−1)m−2q−2
)
V.
Proof. We denote the (m− q) correct values as {v1, . . . , vm−q}, and Kr = Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}).
Using Blanchard et al. [2] Proposition 1, we have
E
∥∥∥∥Kr −
∑
Kr→correct j v˜j
|Kr → correct j|
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ 2(m− q + q(m− q − 2) + q2(m− q − 1)m− 2q − 2
)
V,
where Kr → correct j is the set of correct elements in the m− q − 2 nearest neighbours to Kr in
{v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, measured by Euclidean distance. Thus, we obtain
E‖Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g‖2
≤ 2E
∥∥∥∥Kr −
∑
Kr→correct j v˜j
|Kr → correct j|
∥∥∥∥2 + 2E∥∥∥∥g −
∑
Kr→correct j v˜j
|Kr → correct j|
∥∥∥∥2
≤ 4
(
m− q + q(m− q − 2) + q
2(m− q − 1)
m− 2q − 2
)
V + 2
∑
Kr→correct j E ‖g − v˜j‖2
|Kr → correct j|
≤ 4
(
m− q + q(m− q − 2) + q
2(m− q − 1)
m− 2q − 2
)
V + 2(m− q)V
=
(
6m− 6q + 4q(m− q − 2) + 4q
2(m− q − 1)
m− 2q − 2
)
V.
Proposition 1. Averaging is not dimensional Byzantine resilient.
Proof. We demonstrate a counter example. Consider the case where
v˜i =
{
vi, ∀i ∈ [m− 1]
−g −∑m−1i=1 vi, i = m, (3)
where g = E[vi], ∀i ∈ [m]. Thus, the resulting aggregation is Aggr = −g/m. The inner product
〈E[Aggr], g〉 is always negative under the Byzantine attack. Thus, SGD is not expectedly descendant,
which means it will not converge to critical points. Note that in this counter example, the number of
Byzantine values of each dimension is 1.
Hence, averaging is not dimensional Byzantine-resilient.
Proposition 2. Any aggregation rule Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} is
not dimensional Byzantine resilient.
Proof. We demonstrate a counter example. Consider the case where the ith dimension of the ith
vector vi is manipulated by the malicious workers (e.g. multiplied by an arbitrarily large negative
value), where i ∈ [m]. Thus, up to 1 value of each dimension is Byzantine. However, no matter
which vector is chosen, as long as the aggregation is chosen from {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, the inner product
〈E[Aggr], g〉 can be arbitrarily large negative value under the Byzantine attack. Thus, SGD is not
expectedly descendant, which means it will not converge to critical points.
Hence, any aggregation rule that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} is not dimensional Byzantine-
resilient.
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8.2 Trimmed mean
We use the following lemma to bound the one-dimensional trimmed mean.
Lemma 2. Assume that among the scalar sequence {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, q elements are Byzantine.
Without loss of generality, we denote the remaining correct values as {v1, . . . , vm−q}. Thus, for
q < b ≤ dm/2e − 1, v(b−q+i):(m−q) ≤ v˜(b+i):m ≤ v(b+i):(m−q), for ∀i ∈ [m− 2b], where v˜(b+i):m
is the (b+ i)th smallest element in {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, and v(b+i):(m−q) is the (b+ i)th smallest element
in {v1, . . . , vm−q}.
Proof. We prove the two inequalities separately.
(i) We prove the first inequality v(b−q+i):(m−q) ≤ v˜(b+i):m by contradiction.
If v(b−q+i):(m−q) > v˜(b+i):m, then there will be ((m− q)− (b− q + i) + 1) = (m − b − i + 1)
correct values larger than v˜(b+i):m. However, because v˜(b+i):m is the (b + i)-th smallest element
in the sequence {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, there is at most (m− (b+ i)) = (m− b− i) elements larger than
v˜(b+i):m, which yields a contradiction.
(ii) We prove the second inequality v˜(b+i):m ≤ v(b+i):(m−q) by contradiction.
If v˜(b+i):m > v(b+i):(m−q), then there will be (b+ i) correct values smaller than v˜(b+i):m. However,
because v˜(b+i):m is the (b+ i)-th smallest element in the sequence {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}, there is at most
(b+ i− 1) elements smaller than v˜(b+i):m, which yields a contradiction.
Theorem 1. (Bounded Variance) Let v1, . . . , vm be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G − g‖2 ≤ V . In each dimension, q values are Byzantine, which
yields {v˜i : i ∈ [m]}. If 2q < m, we have E‖Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) − g‖2 ≤ ∆1, where
∆1 =
2(b+1)(m−q)
(m−b−q)2 V.
Proof. We first assume that all the vi’s, v˜i’s, and g are scalars, with the variance V = σ2. Using
Lemma 2, we have
m−q−b∑
i=b−q+1
(vi:(m−q) − g) ≤
m−b∑
i=b+1
(v˜i:m − g) ≤
m−b∑
i=b+1
(vi:(m−q) − g)
⇒
∑m−q−b
i=1 (vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q ≤
∑m−b
i=b+1(v˜i:m − g)
m− 2b ≤
∑m−q
i=b+1(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
⇒
[∑m−b
i=b+1(v˜i:m − g)
m− 2b
]2
≤ max

[∑m−q−b
i=1 (vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
,
[∑m−q
i=b+1(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2 .
Thus, we have
[Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2
=
[∑m−b
i=b+1 v˜i:m
m− 2b − g
]2
≤ max

[∑m−q−b
i=1 (vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
,
[∑m−q
i=b+1(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2 .
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Note that for arbitrary subset S ⊆ [m− q], |S| = m− b− q, we have the following bound:[∑
i∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
=
[∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)−
∑
i/∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
≤ 2
[∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
+ 2
[∑
i/∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
=
2(m− q)2
(m− b− q)2
[∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)
m− q
]2
+
2b2
(m− b− q)2
[∑
i/∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)
b
]2
≤ 2(m− q)
2
(m− b− q)2
[∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)
m− q
]2
+
2b2
(m− b− q)2
∑
i/∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)2
b
≤ 2(m− q)
2
(m− b− q)2
[∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)
m− q
]2
+
2b2
(m− b− q)2
∑
i∈[m−q](vi:(m−q) − g)2
b
.
By taking the expectations, we obtain
E
[∑
i∈S(vi:(m−q) − g)
m− b− q
]2
≤ 2(m− q)
2
(m− b− q)2
σ2
m− q +
2b2
(m− b− q)2
(m− q)σ2
b
=
2(m− q)σ2
(m− b− q)2 +
2b(m− q)σ2
(m− b− q)2
=
2(b+ 1)(m− q)σ2
(m− b− q)2 .
Combining all the ingredients above, we obtain the desired result:
E [Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2 ≤ 2(b+ 1)(m− q)σ
2
(m− b− q)2 .
Then, we generalize vi’s, v˜i’s, and g to d-dimensional vectors with the variance V =
∑d
j=1 σ
2
j ,
where E‖Gj − gj‖2 ≤ σ2j , ∀j ∈ [d]. For ∀j ∈ [d], we have
E [Trmeanb({(v˜i)j : i ∈ [m]})− gj ]2 ≤
2(b+ 1)(m− q)σ2j
(m− b− q)2 .
Thus, we have
E [Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2 ≤
2(b+ 1)(m− q)∑dj=1 σ2j
(m− b− q)2 =
2(b+ 1)(m− q)
(m− b− q)2 V.
8.3 Phocas
The following lemma bounds the one-dimensional Phocasb(·).
Lemma 3. For the scalar sequence {v˜i ∈ [m]}, and the corresponding trimmed mean Trmeanb =
Trmeanb({v˜i ∈ [m]}), we have
|v˜i/Trmeanb − Trmeanb| ≤ |vi/Trmeanb − Trmeanb|,
where i ∈ [m− q], {vi : i ∈ [m− q]} is the sequence of (m− q) correct values in {v˜i ∈ [m]}.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Assume that |v˜i/Trmeanb − Trmeanb| > |vi/Trmeanb − Trmeanb|. Thus, there are i correct values
closer than v˜i/Trmeanb to Trmeanb. However, according to the definition of v˜i/Trmeanb , it is the ith
closest value to Trmeanb, which means that there are at most (i− 1) values closer than v˜i/Trmeanb
to Trmeanb, which yields a contradiction.
Theorem 2. (Bounded Variance) Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t.
vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and E‖G − g‖2 ≤ V . In each dimension, q values are Byzantine, which
yields {v˜i : i ∈ [m]} If 2q < n, we have E‖Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]}) − g‖2 ≤ ∆2, where
∆2 =
[
4 + 12(b+1)(m−q)(m−b−q)2
]
V.
Proof. We first assume that all the vi’s, v˜i’s, and g are scalars, with the variance V = σ2. For
convenience, we denote Trmeanb = Trmeanb({v˜i ∈ [m]}). Thus, we have
[Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2
≤ 2 [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− Trmeanb]2 + 2 [g − Trmeanb]2 .
Using Theorem 1, we already have
E [g − Trmeanb]2 ≤ 2(b+ 1)(m− q)σ
2
(m− b− q)2 .
We only need to bound [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− Trmeanb]2 as follows:
[Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− Trmeanb]2
=
[∑m−b
i=1 v˜i/Trmeanb − Trmeanb
m− b
]2
≤
∑m−b
i=1
[
v˜i/Trmeanb − Trmeanb
]2
m− b
≤
∑m−b
i=1
[
vi/Trmeanb − Trmeanb
]2
m− b
≤
∑m−q
i=1
[
vi/Trmeanb − Trmeanb
]2
m− q
=
∑m−q
i=1 [vi − Trmeanb]2
m− q
≤
∑m−q
i=1 2 [vi − g]2
m− q +
∑m−q
i=1 2 [g − Trmeanb]2
m− q
≤
∑m−q
i=1 2 [vi − g]2
m− q + 2 [g − Trmeanb]
2
.
Taking expectation on both sides, we have
E [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− Trmeanb]2 ≤ 2σ2 + 2E [g − Trmeanb]2 .
Thus, we have
E [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2
≤ 2E [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− Trmeanb]2 + 2E [g − Trmeanb]2
≤ 4σ2 + 6E [g − Trmeanb]2
≤ 4σ2 + 12(b+ 1)(m− q)σ
2
(m− b− q)2 .
Then, generalizing vi’s, v˜i’s, and g to d-dimensional vectors with the variance V , we obtain the
desired result
E [Phocasb({v˜i : i ∈ [m]})− g]2 ≤
[
4 +
12(b+ 1)(m− q)
(m− b− q)2
]
V.
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8.4 Convergence analysis
8.4.1 Strongly convex functions
The following lemma is from [4].
Lemma 4. Let F be µF -strongly convex and LF -smooth. Then for all x, y ∈ Rd, one has
〈∇F (x)−∇F (y), x− y〉 ≥ µFLF
µF + LF
‖x− y‖2 + 1
µF + LF
‖∇F (x)−∇F (y)‖2.
Theorem 3. Assume that F (x) is µF -strongly convex and LF -smooth, where 0 < µF ≤ LF . We
take γ ≤ 2µF+LF . In any iteration t, the correct gradients are vti = ∇Fi(xt). Using any (classic
or dimensional) ∆-Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule with corresponding assumptions, we obtain
linear convergence with a constant error after T iterations with synchronous SGD:
E‖xT − x∗‖ ≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)T
‖x0 − x∗‖+ µF + LF
µFLF
γ
√
∆.
Proof. Denote the aggregation rule as Aggr(·), and g(xt) = Aggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}), and xt+1 =
xt − γg(xt).
Thus, we have
‖xt+1 − x∗‖ = ‖xt − γg(xt)− x∗‖ ≤ ‖xt − γ∇F (xt)− x∗‖+ ‖γ∇F (xt)− γg(xt)‖. (4)
Furthermore, we have
‖xt − γ∇F (xt)− x∗‖2 = ‖xt − x∗‖2 + γ2‖∇F (xt)‖2 − 2γ 〈xt − x∗,∇F (xt)〉 .
Using the µF -strong convexity, LF -smoothness of F (x), and Lemma 4 with x = xt, y = x∗, we
have 〈∇F (xt), xt − x∗〉 ≥ µFLF
µF + LF
‖xt − x∗‖2 + 1
µF + LF
‖∇F (xt)‖2.
Taking γ ≤ 2µF+LF , we obtain
‖xt − γ∇F (xt)− x∗‖2
≤ ‖xt − x∗‖2 + γ2‖∇F (xt)‖2 − 2γ
(
µFLF
µF + LF
‖xt − x∗‖2 + 1
µF + LF
‖∇F (xt)‖2
)
≤
(
1− 2γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖2 + γ
(
γ − 2
µF + LF
)
‖∇F (xt)‖2
≤
(
1− 2γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖2.
Note that when γ ≤ 2µF+LF , we have
2γµFLF
µF+LF
≤ 4µFLF(µF+LF )2 ≤ 1. Using
√
1− a ≤ 1− a2 , ∀a ≤ 1,
we obtain
‖xt − γ∇F (xt)− x∗‖ ≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖.
Combined with Equation 4, we obtain
‖xt+1 − x∗‖ ≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖+ γ‖∇F (xt)− g(xt)‖.
Conditional on xt, taking the expectation on both sides, we obtain
E‖xt+1 − x∗‖
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖+ γE‖∇F (xt)− g(xt)‖
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖+ γ
√
E‖∇F (xt)− g(xt)‖2 . Jenssen’s inequality
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)
‖xt − x∗‖+ γ
√
∆. . ∆-Byzantine resilience
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By telescoping and taking total expectation, we obtain
E‖xT − x∗‖
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)T
‖x0 − x∗‖+
T−1∑
i=0
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)i
γ
√
∆
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)T
‖x0 − x∗‖+
+∞∑
i=0
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)i
γ
√
∆
≤
(
1− γµFLF
µF + LF
)T
‖x0 − x∗‖+ µF + LF
µFLF
γ
√
∆. .
+∞∑
i=0
ai =
1
1− a , for |a| < 1
8.4.2 General functions
For general non-strongly convex functions and non-convex functions, we provide the following
convergence guarantee.
Theorem 4. Assume that F (x) is LF -smooth and potentially non-convex, where 0 < LF . We
take γ ≤ 1LF . In any iteration t, the correct gradients are vti = ∇Fi(xt). Using any (classic or
dimensional) ∆-Byzantine-resilient aggregation rule with corresponding assumptions, we obtain
linear convergence with a constant error after T iterations with synchronous SGD:∑T−1
i=0 E‖∇F (xi)‖2
T
≤ 2
γT
[
F (x0)− F (x∗)]+ ∆.
Proof. Denote the aggregation rule as Aggr(·), and g(xt) = Aggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [m]}), and xt+1 =
xt − γg(xt).
To prove the convergence with constant error, we first bound the descendant of the loss value in each
iteration.
F (xt+1) ≤ F (xt) + 〈∇F (xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ LF
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 . smoothness
= F (xt)− γ 〈∇F (xt), g(xt)〉+ LF γ2
2
‖g(xt)‖2
≤ F (xt)− γ 〈∇F (xt), g(xt)〉+ γ
2
‖g(xt)‖2 . γ ≤ 1
LF
= F (xt)− γ
2
‖∇F (xt)‖2 + γ
2
‖∇F (xt)− g(xt)‖2.
Thus, we obtain
F (xt+1)− F (x∗) ≤ F (xt)− F (x∗)− γ
2
‖∇F (xt)‖2 + γ
2
‖∇F (xt)− g(xt)‖2.
By telescoping and taking total expectation, we obtain
0 ≤ E [F (xT )− F (x∗)] ≤ F (x0)− F (x∗)− γ
2
T−1∑
i=0
E‖∇F (xi)‖2 + γ
2
T∆.
By rearranging the terms, we obtain the desired result∑T−1
i=0 E‖∇F (xi)‖2
T
≤ 2
γT
[
F (x0)− F (x∗)]+ ∆.
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8.5 Experimental details
In Table 2 and 3, we show the detailed network structures of the MLP and CNN used in our
experiments.
Table 2: MLP Summary
Layer (type) Parameters Previous Layer
flatten(Flatten) null data
fc1(FullyConnected) #output=128 flatten
relu1(Activation) null fc1
fc2(FullyConnected) #output=128 relu1
relu2(Activation) null fc2
fc3(FullyConnected) #output=10 relu2
softmax(SoftmaxOutput) null fc3
Table 3: CNN Summary
Layer (type) Parameters Previous Layer
conv1(Convolution) channels=32, kernel_size=3, padding=1 data
activation1(Activation) null conv1
conv2(Convolution) channels=32, kernel_size=3, padding=1 activation1
activation2(Activation) null conv2
pooling1(Pooling) pool_size=2 activation2
dropout1(Dropout) probability=0.2 pooling1
conv3(Convolution) channels=64, kernel_size=3, padding=1 dropout1
activation2(Activation) null conv3
conv4(Convolution) channels=64, kernel_size=3, padding=1 activation2
activation4(Activation) null conv4
pooling2(Pooling) pool_size=2 activation4
dropout2(Dropout) probability=0.2 pooling2
flatten1(Flatten) null dropout2
fc1(FullyConnected) #output=512 flatten1
activation5(Activation) null fc1
dropout3(Dropout) probability=0.2 activation5
fc2(FullyConnected) #output=512 dropout3
activation6(Activation) null fc2
dropout4(Dropout) probability=0.2 activation6
fc3(FullyConnected) #output=10 dropout4
softmax(SoftmaxOutput) null fc3
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8.6 Additional experiments
In this section, we illustrate the additional empirical results.
In Figure 4, we illustrate the top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST when batch-size varies, without
Byzantine failures. The learning rate is
γ =
0.1× batchsize
32
.
The results show that when there is no Byzantine failures, Phocas performs just like Mean. Trmean
has slightly slower convergence. Krum is the slowest. The gap is narrowed when the batch size
increases.
We illustrate all the experimental results of CNN on CIFAR10 additional to Section 5. For com-
pleteness, we also illustrate the experimental results of MLP on MNIST. The results are shown in
Figure 5-14. In general, all the experiments of CNN on CIFAR10 show similar results with the
experiments of MLP on MNIST.
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(a) MLP on MNIST without Byzantine with different batch sizes
Figure 4: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST without Byzantine failures, when batch size varies. The
learning rate is γ = 0.1×batchsize32 .
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(b) MLP on MNIST without Byzantine (zoomed)
Figure 5: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST without Byzantine failures.
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(a) MLP on MNIST with Gaussian
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(b) MLP on MNIST with Gaussian (zoomed)
Figure 6: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Gaussian attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are
replaced by i.i.d. random vectors drawn from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 200 standard
deviation.
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(a) MLP on MNIST with omniscient
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(b) MLP on MNIST with omniscient (zoomed)
Figure 7: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with omniscient attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors
are replaced by the negative sum of all the correct gradients, scaled by a large constant (1e20 in the
experiments).
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(a) MLP on MNIST with bit-flip
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(b) MLP on MNIST with bit-flip (zoomed)
Figure 8: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with bit-flip attack. For the first 1000 dimensions, 1 of
the 20 floating numbers is manipulated by flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th bits.
21
100 200 300 400 500
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
To
p-
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean
Krum
Trmean9
Trmean6
Multi-Krum
Phocas8
Mean without Byzantine
(a) MLP on MNIST with gambler
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(b) MLP on MNIST with gambler (zoomed)
Figure 9: Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with gambler attack. The parameters are evenly assigned
to 20 servers. For one single server, any received value is multiplied by −1e20 with probability
0.05%.
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Figure 10: Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 without Byzantine failures
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Figure 11: Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with Gaussian attack
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Iteration
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
To
p-
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy Mean
Krum
Trmean9
Trmean6
Multi-Krum
Phocas6
Mean without Byzantine
Figure 12: Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with omniscient attack
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Figure 13: Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with bit-flip attack
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Figure 14: Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with gambler attack.
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